
25X1 Approved For Release 2008/02/11: CIA-RDP78B04558A001800050016-1

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PRITY 0712	RYBAT	3 MAY 1963 25X1	
FOR MESSRS.	REBER		7. HFS 25X
REF 6599			25X1

- AS DISCUSSED WITH YOU IN GENERAL TERMS THIS AM, I FEEL THATE THE PROPOSAL MADE BY YOU IN REFERENCE IS OVERLOOKING CERTAIN BASIC CONSIDERATION.
- THE MAIN REASON THAT DOD COMPONENTS WISH TO HAVE THIS MATERIAL AT THE SECRET LEVEL IS SO THAT IT WILL FACILITATE PLACING THESE MATERIALS IN THE TARGET FOLDERS AND FOR USE IN MAPPING PROGRAMS WITHOUT GOING THRU THE NORMAL STEPS OF DOWNGRADING. THE REASON WHY DOWNGRADING IS DIFFICULT IS THAT THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT TALENT-CLEARED PERSONNEL CAPABLE OF DOWNGRADING TALENT MATERIALS SO THAT IT MAY BE UTILIZED BY SECRET-CLEARED PERSONNEL. THE PARADOX IS THAT MATERIALS WHICH ARE TOO SENSITIVE TO HANDLE BY PERSONNEL WHO CANNOT BE CLEARED FOR TOP SECRET CAN, PER THIS PROPOSAL. RECEIVE SOME OF THESE MATERIALS AT THE SECRET LEVEL. IF YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO PROTECT THE SOURCE AND THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE THEN IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THESE METERIALS SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE TALENT SYSTEM AND SELECTIVELY RELEASED UNDER EXISTING DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS.
- TO CLASSIFY THE FILM SECRET AND THEN INSIST THAT THE B. RESULTS OF SOME ANALYSIS AND NOT ALL ANALYSIS BE PLACED AND HANDLED IN THE TALENT SYSTEM APPEARS TO ME TO POSE ALMOST

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INSURMOUNTABLE CONTROL PROBLEMS. FILM WHICH IS CODEWORD CONTROLLED AND THEN DOWNGRADED PROPERLY PERMITS THE FILM CUSTODIAN TO CONTROL THE RELEASE OF THE DOWNGRADED (SECRET) MATERIALS. BUT IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL AND ADMINISTER FILM CLASSIFIED ONLY SECRET AND BEARING NO CONTROL SLUG AND AT THE SAME TIME ENSURE THAT THESE SPECIFIC MATERIALS CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN THE TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM.

- C. RE PARA A (2) IF YOUR PROPOSED PROCEDURE APPLIES, WHY SHOULD THE ORIGINAL BE PROCESSED ONLY IN CENTERS CONFORMING TO TALENT AND OR BYEMAN SECURITY CONTROL STANDARDS? I PRESUME, BECAUSE IT IS TOO SENSITIVE TO HANDLE IN OTHER CENTERS. HOW THEN CAN THESE MATERIALS BE RELEASED AT THE SECRET LEVEL TO PERSONNEL WORKING IN NON-TALENT OR NON-BYEMAN CONTROL AREAS. FURTHERMORE, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "CENTERS CONFORMING TO"? EITHER YOU HAVE A TALENT OR BYEMAN CONTROL CENTER OR YOU DO NOT HAVE ONE.
- D. RE PARA A (4) AND (5) FOR MAPPING PROGRAMS COMPLETE ROLLS
  OF FILM MUST BE USED. HOW THEN CAN YOU KEEP THEM IN TALENT
  CENTERS AND ENSURE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE RELEASED?
- E. RE PARA (6) CAMERA CONFIGURATION HAS ALREADY BEEN
  DETERMINED TO BE "SECRET" AND INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED IN COMOR
  MINUTES SOME TIME AGO.
- F. RE PARA (7) HOW CAN YOU KEEP SECRET MATERIAL IN THE TALENT SYSTEM WITHOUT PUTTING THE CODEWORD ON IT. FURTHERMORE, THE LARGE-SCALE PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT IN THE SYSTEM AND THE SAME

COVERAGE CAN BE ACQUIRED. THE ONLY WAY THAT YOU CAN CONTROL
THE RELEASE IS TO PUT ALL PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE SYSTEM AND PROVIDE
FOR APPRPORIATE DOWNGRADING.

- G. RE PARA B (1) HOW CAN YOU PUT MATERIAL IN THE SYSTEM BASED ON NON-SYSTEM PHOTOGRAPHY? FURTHERMORE, THE USER HAS NEED OF THE PLOTS AS DOES THE CUSTODIAN OF THE FILM. IF THE FILM IS SECRET AND THE PLOT IS CONTROLLED IN THE SYSTEM THE PLOTS ARE RELATIVELY USELESS.
- H. RE PARA B (1) AND (2) SINCE THE IMMEDIATE PI REPORT
  PRODUCED IN THE FIELD IS BASED ON THE TARGETS ALONG THE FLIGHT
  LINE, THE READOUT, IF PLOTTED, COULD APPROXIMATE THE FLIGHT LINE.
  THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE IS REVEALED BY BOTH THE MISSION COVERAGE
  INDEX AS WELL AS THE IMMEDIATE PI READOUT. THE ONLY SAFE
  PROCEDURE IS TO PREDUCE A SITSUM WHICH STATES THAT THE SITSUM
  IS A COMPILATION FROM RELIABLE SOURCES. WHY SHOULD THERE BE A
  DIFFERENCE IN CLASSIFICATION BETWEEN READOUTS? IT IS ILLOGICAL
  TO CLASSIFY THE FILM SECRET, ONE FORM OF READOUT SECRET AND
  AMOTHER IN THE TALENT SYSTEM.
  - 1. RE PARA B (3) WHAT IS MEANT BY THIS PARAGRAPH?
- 2. IN CONCLUSION I WOULD OFFER THAT A BASIC DECISION HAS TO BE MADE; E.G. IS IT IMPORTANT TO PROTECT THE SOURCE AND SCOPE OF COVERAGE? IF SO, AND THIS WARRANTS INCLUSION IN THE TALENT

CONTROL SYSTEM, THEN THE MATERIALS SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE TALENT CONTROL SYSTEM. IF NOT, THESE MATERIALS SHOULD BE HANDLED AS SECRET. BUT LET'S NOT COMPLICATE THE HANDLING PROBLEMS ANYMORE THAN THEY ARE AT PRESENT. IF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE IS FOLLOWED, THERE WILL BE A RASH OF VIOLATIONS AND THE RESULTS MAY BE QUITE SERIOUS.

P.S. YOUR MESSAGE SHOULD HAVE HA	D THE SLUG ALSO.
SECRET	
CFN 0712 REBER	6599 I DOD TALENT-CLEARED
CANNOT BE TOP SECRET PER NOT ALL	NO CONTROL SLUG RE PARA A (2)
BYEMAN NON-TALENT NON-BYEMAN NOT	HAVE RE PARA A (4) (5) NOT
BE RE PARA (6) RE PARA (7) NOT IN	RE PARA B (1) NON-SYSTEM RE
PARAS B (1) (2) PI PI A A RE PARA	B (3) I A E G NOT THESE NOT
COMPLICATE VIOLATIONS P S	
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